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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides the statute of limita-
tions for suits involving contracts for the sale of goods.' Under section 2-725, an
action must be brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. 2 A
cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach.3 Generally, a breach of warranty occurs when tender
of delivery 4 is made.5 The exception to this general rule is that "where a warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or
should have been discovered.' '6 Simply stated, the four-year period will begin to run
either on the date of tender of delivery (date-of-delivery rule), or on the date on which
the breach is or should have been discovered (date-of-discovery rule), depending on
whether the warranty is classified as one that extends to future performance.
Despite its apparent simplicity, section 2-725 can cause unfair results. If the
date-of-delivery rule is applied, a purchaser of a defective product may discover that
the statute of limitations has expired before the defect is discovered. On the other hand,
if the date-of-discovery rule is applied, a seller may be forced to defend against a breach
of warranty claim many years after the sale occurred, and long after the records of the
sale have been destroyed. Section 2-725 attempts to achieve fair results by asking
whether a warranty "explicitly extends to future performance.'' 7 Unfortunately, the
Code's attempt at fairness fails because the test is unwieldy and susceptible to
1. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978) provides:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action
has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year
but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of
the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly
extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance
the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available
a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the
time limit and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from
voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action
which have accrued before this Act becomes effective.
2. Id. § 2-725(1).
3. Id. § 2-725(2).
4. U.C.C. § 2-503(1) provides that "(t)ender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming goods
at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery." Courts
have held that for purposes of § 2-725, the goods do not have to be conforming goods to constitute a tender of delivery.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Bear Archery, 587 F.2d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1978).
5. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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conflicting interpretations. This Note will propose an amended version of section
2-725 designed to alleviate these problems.
Two principal problems have arisen from the language of section 2-725. The
first stems from the fact that section 2-725 offers no guidance on when a warranty
"explicitly extends to future performance." 8 Since each court faced with interpreting
a warranty must resolve this question on its own, predictably, even a cursory review
of the case law discloses inconsistent and often irreconcilable decisions. 9 One reason
for the inconsistent decisions is the seemingly harsh result that a statute of limitations
works on plaintiffs in cutting off their causes of action before an injury is discov-
ered.' 0 To avoid this harsh result, some courts have manipulated section 2-725 by
varying the requirements for future performance warranties. Other courts have simply
held section 2-725 inapplicable. As one commentary points out, "(s)ection 2-725
offers a sane and workable statutory scheme, but it is one the courts will infrequently
follow when the plaintiff's blood has been spilled." '
A second problem concerns the applicability of section 2-725. This problem is
caused by the intersection of strict product liability and warranty liability. 12 Persons
who are injured by a defective product can sue in tort under a product liability theory,
or in contract in a breach of warranty action. Tort statutes of limitations generally do
not begin to run until the date of injury. 13 A court that wishes to extend an injured
plaintiff's contract action may apply the tort statute of limitations over section 2-725.14
This clearly contradicts section 2-725's mandate that it applies to "an action for breach
of any contract for sale" 15 and prevents the uniformity that the Code seeks to achieve. 16
The confusion that has resulted over choosing the applicable statute of limita-
tions was emphatically illustrated by Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales
Co.,17 a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. The case involved an action for
damages for breach of an implied warranty in a sale of goods. 18 The issue on appeal
was the applicable Ohio statute of limitations.' 9 Neither party had even addressed the
possibility that section 2-725 might apply.20 The defendant contended that the tort
8. Id.
9. For cases construing § 2-725(2), see U.C.C. Case Dig. 2725.21 (1981 and 1985). For cases which hold that
the future performance exception does apply, see Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1981);
Glen Peck, Ltd. v. Fritsche, 651 P.2d 414 (Colo. App. 1982); Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 669 P.2d 1057 (Mont.
1983); Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983); Rochester welding Supply Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980).
For cases which hold that the future performance exception does not apply see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980); Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of America, Inc.,
575 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. I1l. 1983); LaPorte v. R.D. Werner Co., 561 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
10. 3 W. HAwKLAND, U.C.C. SEuras § 2-725:02, at 479 (Callaghan 1982).
11. J. WHrrE & R. SuMsims, Ummoes COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-9, at 420 (1980).
12. Id. at 415.
13. Id. at 416.
14. See Witherspoon v. General Motors Corp., 535 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (the tort statute of limitations
applied to implied warranty claims involving personal injuries that were tortious in nature).
15. U.C.C. § 2-725(l) (1978).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
17. 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 851.
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statute should apply, whereas the plaintiff argued for the fifteen-year written contract
statute. 21 Only after counsel were granted additional time to research this issue was it
determined that section 2-725 was controlling. 22
This Note will begin its analysis of section 2-725 by examining the purposes the
section seeks to achieve. The needs of buyers and sellers of goods will be identified
in order to determine if they are currently being met by section 2-725. Next, the cases
interpreting the future performance exception and the confusion surrounding the
choice of the applicable statute of limitations will be analyzed. That analysis will
illustrate the flaws in the current version of section 2-725. Finally, a proposal to
amend section 2-725 will be presented and examined to determine whether it fulfills
the purposes of section 2-725 and whether it meets the needs of buyers and sellers of
goods.
I. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 2-725
"The underlying purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code is to 'simplify,
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.., and to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.'-"23 Therefore, if an Ohio court
classifies a warranty as a prospective warranty, 24 and a California court classifies the
same warranty as a present warranty, one of the primary purposes behind the Uniform
Commercial Code is not being fulfilled.
One reason for having a statute of limitations is to provide a period of time after
which sellers can destroy sales records and put their minds at ease regarding possible
claims from defective products32 A statute of limitations attempts to prevent the
assertion of stale claims. As time passes, witnesses die or move away, memories fade,
and documents are lost. A statute of limitations is arbitrary; rather than dividing
meritorious claims from nonmeritorious ones, 26 it establishes a length of time after
which a claim cannot be brought. 27 Because of its arbitrary nature, sometimes a
statute of limitations will appear to cause injustice by preventing a valid claim from
being asserted. It is hoped that the disadvantages resulting from cutting off a few good
claims will be outweighed by the benefits that are derived from preventing stale
claims. 28 By adopting section 2-725 and other statutes of limitations, state legisla-
tures have tacitly accepted this theory. For a court to manipulate a statute of
limitations in order to avoid what it thinks would be a harsh result ignores the
legislature's command. Furthermore, if one accepts the argument that trying stale
21. Id. at 850-51.
22. Id.
23. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a), (c), quoted in Schmitt & Hanko, For Whom the Bell Tolls-An Interpretation of the
UCC's Exception as to Accrual of a Cause of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 ARK. L. REV. 311 (1974).
24. As used in this Note, a "prospective warranty" is one that explicitly extends to future performance. Thus, the
date-of-discovery rule will be applied to prospective warranties. "Present warranties" do not extend to future perfor-
mance, and the date-of-delivery rule will be applied to them.
25. 3 W. HAW L.AND, supra note 10, at 479.
26. See generally T. QuinN, U.C.C. Co.nmarrARv AmD LAW DIGEST 2-725(A), at 2-513 (1978).
27. Id.
28. See Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 23, at 329.
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cases will often lead to bad results, then the court may be causing an injustice rather
than preventing it.
It is apparent that section 2-725 has been drafted with these concerns in mind.
Subsection 2-725(2) provides the general rule that the four-year period begins to run
when tender of delivery is made "regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach.' '29 It is clearly within the drafters' intention to allow a claim
for breach of warranty to be barred even before the purchaser learns that the warranty
has been breached. 30 While this appears to be a harsh result, it emphasizes the
importance that the drafters of section 2-725 attached to the above-described policies
underlying statutes of limitations. Despite this importance, the drafters created an
exception to the usual four-year period for future performance warranties. This
exception recognizes the existence of some interest which outweighs the policies
behind the statute of limitations. 31 One important interest protected by the exception
is the freedom of parties to contract as they see fit.32 For example, by giving a
warranty which explicitly extends to future performance, a seller is agreeing to extend
the normal period that a buyer would be allowed to bring an action for breach of
warranty. A court should extend this period only because the parties have contracted
to extend the period, not merely because the court feels that a buyer has been injured.
To do otherwise would be to ignore the importance the drafters of section 2-725 and
the legislatures have implicitly placed on the purpose of the statute of limitations. The
requirement that the warranty explicitly extend to future performance before the
date-of-discovery rule is applied can be used to support the above reasoning. The
additional requirement of explicit language narrows the exception so that fewer cases
will come within the exception. 33 This shows the importance that is placed on the
general rule without limiting in any way the freedom of the parties to extend the
period contractually should they so desire.
III. THE COMMERCIAL EXIGENCIES OF BUYERS AND SELLERS
A commercial code is intended to provide a legal framework for doing busi-
ness. 34 Therefore, before it is included in a commercial code, a statute should be
examined to ensure that it meets the economic needs of buyers and sellers. A buyer
of a product wants to receive what he or she has bargained for. If a product is defective
and the seller refuses to correct the problem, the legal system should be available to
protect the buyer's expectation interest. 35 Two reasons for having a statute of
limitations can be easily identified. The need for a seller to be able to destroy records
and plan ahead without fear of lawsuits arising out of the distant past has been
29. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
30. 3 W. HAWKLAND, supra note 10, at 479.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
32. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978) provides that "(t)he effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by
agreement . . . . Thus, the U.C.C. places great importance on the principle of freedom of contract.
33. 3 W. HAwKLaD, supra note 10, at 480.
34. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1978).
35. Expectation interest refers to the value of the benefit a party would have received from the contract if the
defendant had not breached the contract, but had completed performance as agreed.
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discussed above. The other reason relates to matters of proof in a defective product
case. The longer the period of time between the sale of the product and the discovery
of a defect, the more likely it is that the "defect" is actually the result of misuse of
the product by the buyer, rather than a problem originating with the seller.36 Section
2-725 voices the principle that four years is a sufficient period of time in which to
discover latent defects.
Buyers may be heard to complain that a warranty is of no value if the statute of
limitations is allowed to expire before there is any way of learning that the warranty
has been breached. Sellers, however, can argue in response that this argument ignores
the fact that the buyer was provided protection for four years. If buyers desire more
protection than this, they can achieve it by contracting for a future performance
warranty under which the four-year period will not begin to run until the breach is
discovered. Of course, this extra protection will only be provided at an additional cost
to the buyer. Future performance warranties are usually negotiated items between
buyers and sellers. Courts should only construe a warranty to be a future performance
warranty if the parties bargained for it. To do otherwise is to provide a windfall to one
party at the expense of the other.
IV. THE FUTURE PERFORMANCE DILEMMA
One of the unfortunate features of section 2-725 is that no guidance is provided
to determine what is meant by the words "explicitly extends to future perfor-
mance. "3 Consequently, courts have been left largely on their own to puzzle out this
problem. The results have been unsatisfactory. 38 One of the purposes of this Note is
to demonstrate that these problems can best be corrected by a revision of section
2-725. However, in recognition of the fact that change can be a slow process, this
Note will attempt to suggest a framework of analysis that might prove helpful to
courts in interpreting this ambiguous section.
A. A Closer Look at Subsection 2-725(2)
Before reviewing cases that have interpreted section 2-725, it is helpful to note
what others have said about the section. At least two commentators find the case law
surrounding section 2-725 confusing. They conclude that "liberal judicial
construction . . . has . . . resulted in a muddying of the waters of interpretation. No
one can safely predict when-and for whom-the bell tolls. ' '3 9 One student author
claims that section 2-725 will not protect the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser.40 Specifically, he refers to the situation in which a buyer's claim has been
36. MODEL UNIFORM PRODucr LIAaiury Act, analysis of § 110(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714 (proposed October 31,
1979).
37. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 56-82.
39. Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 23, at 330.
40. Note, The Code Giveth and the Code Taketh Away: Implied Warranties and the Statute of Limitations, 41 U.
Ptrr. L. Rav. 783 (1980).
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barred before a defect is discovered. 4' To correct the problem, he proposes deletion
of the word "explicitly" from subsection 2-725(2) and allowing the date-of-
discovery rule to be applied to certain implied warranties. 42 This is a logical approach
since the overwhelming weight of authority, as stated by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, is that "an implied warranty by its nature cannot 'explicitly extend to future
performance. '43
In order to fall within the future performance exception in subsection 2-725(2)
and thus subject to the date-of-discovery rule, an action must meet two tests. First,
the warranty at issue must explicitly extend to future performance. 44 Second, the
"discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance. ' '45 This second
test, if applied literally, would mean that if the purchaser could (not should) have
discovered the breach upon delivery, then the date-of-delivery rule would be applied.
Applying this test consistently could greatly reduce the number of cases that fall
within the future performance exception since it is often possible to discover a latent
defect. Although not necessary to the court's holding, in Lawson v. London Arts
Group,46 an action based on Michigan's warranty in fine arts statute, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently explained how this test might be applied:
Assuming without deciding that the defendant's warranty extended to future performance,
the statute also requires that discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance. This is not the situation here. Although the plaintiff reasonably may not have
suspected the breach of warranty until 1976, it would not have been impossible for her to
have discovered the breach earlier. Consequently, this discovery did not necessarily have
to await the [product's] future "performance." 47
Application of this second test could offer the courts a way to turn back recent
expansions of the future performance exception while still using the current version
of subsection 2-725(2).
The converse of this second test has often caused expansion of the future
performance exception. In other words, courts will apply the date-of-discovery rule
any time the breach could not have been discovered at the time of delivery, regardless
whether the warranty explicitly extends to future performance. 48 This practice was
criticized in Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-America Corp.49 Binkley Co. involved an
action for breach of a warranty that a welding device would meet certain specifica-
41. Id.
42. Id. at 798.
43. Clark v. Delaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tate,
257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602, 606 (1974); Everhart v. Rich's Inc., 128 Ga. App. 319, 196 S.E.2d 475 (1973); Voth
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21111. App. 3d 867,
315 N.E.2d 580 (1974); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978); Continental Oil Co. v. General Am.
Transp. Co., 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (citing Oklahoma law); see also J. Wrm & R. SuM.ERs, supra note 11.
44. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
45. Id.
46. 708 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1983).
47. Id. at 228 (emphasis in original).
48. See, e.g., Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416 (C.P. Mercer Co. 1965).
49. 333 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972).
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tions. 50 The plaintiff argued that the future performance exception should apply since
a determination of the device's capabilities could not be made at the time of delivery,
but instead had to wait until installation was complete. 51 The court rejected this
argument, holding that to construe "warranties made without explicit reference to
time" as future performance warranties would "directly conflict with § 2-725(2)."52
One type of warranty that generally is not within the future performance
exception is a repair or replacement warranty. 53 As explained in Ontario Hydro v.
Zallea Systems, Inc.,54 a "repair or replacement warranty merely provides a remedy
if the product becomes defective, while a warranty for future performance guarantees
the performance of the product itself for a stated period of time. ' 55 Thus, it appears
that if a seller only promises to fix a product when it breaks down, then the seller's
only liability will be to fix the product.
B. The Cases
After describing examples that do not, or should not, fit within the future
performance exception, it may be helpful to describe what does qualify for the
exception. "A careful reading of subsection 2-725(2) ... makes it plain that the
exception is a narrow one .... The exception ... seems limited to a single situation,
namely, where the seller expressly gives a warranty for a period of time, such as
guaranteeing a roof for twenty years." 56
One case that followed this narrow interpretation of the future performance
exception was Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,57 in
which the court held that an advertising claim by Johns-Manville that its roofs "are
still performing satisfactorily after more than forty (40) years" could not be relied
upon by Jones & Laughlin to create a warranty that would fit into the future
performance category. 58 However, in Parzek v. New England Log Homes, Inc.,59 a
seller's statement that logs were treated with a preservative "to protect the treated
wood against decay, stain, termites and other insects" was held to be within the
exception since "the very nature of insect infestation, where the insects might not
appear until several years after the infestation occurs, compels the conclusion that the
warranty extended to future performance."- 60 It is difficult to find any explicit
warranty in this case.
Another example of conflicting holdings is found by comparing Stumler v.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1185.
52. Id. at 1187.
53. Note, supra note 40, at 795-96.
54. 569 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del. 1983).
55. Id. at 1266 (emphasis in original).
56. 3 W. HAxL.ND, supra note 10, at 480-81.
57. 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
58. Id. at 291.
59. 92 A.D.2d 954, 460 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
60. Id. at 955, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
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Ferry-Morse Seed Co. 6 1 with Iowa Manufacturing Co. v. Joy Manufacturing Co.62
Stumler involved a sale of tomato seeds. The plaintiff claimed that the seeds did not
produce the type of tomatoes that the defendant had warranted that they would
produce. 63 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "because of the
nature of seed, defects can only be ascertained after a growing period.' 64 Nonethe-
less, the court held that "(s)ince that promised performance is not tied to any specific
time period or future date, it is not a promise that falls within the exception to the
general statute of limitations rule. "65 The court further explained that the "require-
ment of explicitness insures that the parties to the contract have knowingly agreed to
alter the usual statute of limitations provided in the Uniform Commercial Code.''66
Iowa Manufacturing Co. involved the sale of pollution control equipment that was
warranted to achieve specific emissions standards when operated in accordance with
provided instructions. 67 The Supreme Court of Montana held that the warranty
"necessarily contemplates a reasonable period of performance during which the
defect or failure would manifest itself.' '68 Thus, the court held that the statute ran
from discovery and not from delivery.
In Cuthbertson v. Clark Equipment Co.,69 the Supreme Judicial Court looked at
the following warranty: "You have purchased this MICHIGAN Tractor Shovel with
the expectation that it would give you long and faithful service. In its construction we
have taken every precaution to see that you get an efficient, long lived, satisfactory
machine." '70 This warranty was held not to fall within the future performance
exception since the language did not refer to a specific future time. 7' In Mittasch v.
Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc.,72 the New York Supreme Court held that a similar
warranty did fit within the exception. 73 A warranty that a burial vault would give
"satisfactory service at all times" extended to future performance since "the very
nature of the product implies performance over an extended period of time." 74
As the Parzek, Iowa Manufacturing Co., and Mittasch cases demonstrate,
almost any express warranty can be made to fit within the future performance
exception by a court that wants to use the date-of-discovery rule. To date, no court
has held that an implied warranty fits within the exception, although one recent case
comes very close to doing this. In Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.,75 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the future performance exception applied in a
61. 644 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1981).
62. Mont. 669 P.2d 1057 (Mont. 1983).
63. Stumler v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 644 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 1981).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 672.
66. Id.
67. Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 669 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Mont. 1983).
68. Id. at 1060 (emphasis in original).
69. 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982).
70. Id. at 321.
71. Id.
72. 42 A.D.2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
73. Id. at 574, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
74. Id.
75. 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
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breach of warranty action involving aluminum siding. 76 Thus, the action was allowed
to proceed even though the action was filed eleven years after the siding was
installed. 77 The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant breached an implied
warranty of merchantability. 78 The court nonetheless found a way to apply the future
performance exception. First, it applied section 2-313(1)(b), which provides that
"any description of goods which becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. '79 Thus, by
calling the goods "siding," the seller was giving an express warranty.80 Therefore,
the court held that this warranty extended to future performance since "the description
of the goods as 'siding' carried with it the representation that it would last the lifetime
of the house."'' s
In applying subsection 2-725(2), courts face a problem: must the statute be
followed precisely as it is written, or should the courts protect what is perceived to
be the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties?82 Clearly, any statute that
places courts in such a predicament needs to be changed. However, until such a
change is accomplished, courts should follow the statute as it is written. One reason
for this is that the legislature that enacts the statute weighs the various interests and
develops public policy on a uniform basis. A court that ignores the legislature's
legitimate commands is exceeding its powers. Also, only by applying the statute
faithfully can the legislatures be shown the need for change. There is no legitimate
reason for a court to give a purchaser a prospective warranty when the purchaser fails
to negotiate for one.8 3 After all, a purchaser who wants more than four years
protection can bargain with the seller for an express warranty that is prospective.
V. THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2-725
Nowhere is the confusion surrounding section 2-725 more apparent than in an
action to recover for personal injuries suffered as a result of using a defective product.
The reason for this confusion is that plaintiffs usually have the choice of pursuing a
recovery through strict liability or through a breach of warranty action. The Uniform
Commercial Code provides for recovery of damages for personal injury in subsection
2-715(2).84
76. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 215.
77. Id. at 16, 332 N.W.2d at 214.
78. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1978) provides that "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Subsection (2)(c) further provides
that "[g]oods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . .are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used."
79. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 17, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214-15 (1983).
80. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 214.
81. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 214-15.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
83. See supra text following note 36.
84. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978) provides in pertinent part: "(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include . . (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
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A. The Choice
As one commentator has noted, "[t]he overwhelming amount of litigation
involving the relationship between strict tort and UCC warranties has involved the
statute of limitations."-8 5 Courts are faced with applying section 2-725 and its
date-of-delivery rule or the tort statute of limitations and its date-of-discovery rule. 86
Courts have used different methods of making this choice:
Sometimes the courts allow a plaintiff to choose between them and to select the type of
action which is most advantageous to him under the circumstances. At other times, they
follow the gravamen theory, in which they select the principle thrust-the gist-of the
action and thus make the selection for the plaintiff.8 7
Tort statutes of limitations are usually only two years, 8 but because they run
from the date of injury they can sometimes provide a longer period than does section
2-725. When the injury occurs more than two years from the date of delivery, courts
may follow the tort period in order to give the plaintiff a longer time in which to bring
an action. 89 Nonetheless, section 2-725 will in most cases provide a longer period
within which to sue since most injuries caused by defects occur within two years of
delivery. 90 The rule in some courts is that when there is substantial doubt as to which
statute of limitations to apply, the longer period will be applied. 9' Alabama has
adopted a version of subsection 2-725(2) which provides that "a cause of action for
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue when the
injury occurs." 92 This seems to alleviate the problem of which statute of limitations
to apply. However, because it has been enacted by only one state, the provision tends
to frustrate the uniformity that the Code seeks to achieve. 93
B. The Cases
It is often just as difficult to predict which statute of limitations will be applied
as it is to predict whether or not a warranty will be labeled prospective. Cases with
similar fact patterns often receive dissimilar treatment.
An example of dissimilar treatment despite similar fact patterns is the common
situation of a plaintiff suing an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in an
accident caused by a defect in the automobile. In Hanson v. American Motors
Corp. ,94 the plaintiff's complaint alleged a breach of warranty. The claim arose after
the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident as a result of the failure of the
85. Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser's Products Liability Crossword Game: The Strict or Stricter Liability of
Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. Rs. L. REV. 550, 574 (1978-1979).
86. See supra text accompanying note 13.
87. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconsti-
tutional?, 42 TEN. L. REV. 123, 126 (1974).
88. Shanker, supra note 85, at 574.
89. J. WHrrs & R. Sussin, supra note 11.
90. Id. at 416.
91. Crawford County Trust & Savings Bank v. Crawford County, Iowa, 66 F.2d 971, 973 (8th Cir. 1933), cert.
denied, 291 U.S. 664 (1934).
92. At. CODE § 7-2-725(2) (1975).
93. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
94. 83 Mich. App. 553, 269 N.W.2d 222 (1978).
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automobile's steering gear assembly. 95 The court held that the tort statute of limita-
tions would apply if "the cause of action arose out of the breach of an implied
warranty," and section 2-725 would apply where the injury resulted from the breach
of an express warranty. 96 The case was remanded to determine whether there was a
specific contractual provision covering the steering mechanism. 97 A similar result was
reached in Witherspoon v. General Motors Corp.,98 in which the district court stated:
"In the context of personal injury litigation involving defective products, a number
of courts around the country have likewise applied the local statute of limitations for
torts instead of the 4-year period prescribed by the U.C.C. '99 Again, the court was
referring to an action for breach of an implied warranty.
A different result was reached in Rothe v. Ford Motor Co., 100 where section
2-725 was applied to an action for breach of express and implied warranties. The
court rejected prior case law that had applied the tort statute of limitations to actions
for breach of implied warranties by stating that "the clear language of the
Code... suggest(s) a contrary result."'' 1
Morton v. Texas Welding and Manufacturing Co. 10 2 is another illustration of
how a court can manipulate statutes of limitations in order to allow a plaintiff's action
to proceed. The case involved a propane truck explosion which gave rise to tort and
breach of implied warranty claims. In that case, the claim was barred by the tort
statute of limitations since the action was brought more than two years after the date
of injury; 03 nonetheless, the case was allowed to proceed. The district court applied
section 2-725, holding that the four-year period did not begin to run until the buyer
discovered the breach. 104 Rather than hold section 2-725 inapplicable, the court chose
to hold that an implied warranty fell within the future performance exception.
Not only is there disagreement among jurisdictions over which statute of
limitations to apply in a given situation, but often the rule within a state remains
uncertain until the supreme court of the state settles the matter. Three cases construing
Pennsylvania law illustrate this problem. The first of these cases was Patterson v. Her
Majesty Industries, Inc., 105 in which the federal district court held that section 2-725
governed a breach of warranty action to recover for personal injuries. Hahn v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.,'°6 another example of a federal court interpreting Pennsylvania law,
came along two years later. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the
tort statute of limitations applied to an action for breach of an implied warranty. 10 7
The court reasoned that "the concept of implying a warranty to extend liability to the
95. Id. at 554, 269 N.W.2d at 222.
96. Id. at 558, 269 N.W.2d at 224.
97. Id.
98. 535 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
99. Id. at 434.
100. 531 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
101. Id. at 194.
102. 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 11.
105. 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
106. 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 1100.
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manufacturer of a defective product has been, from the outset, only a rather
transparent device to accomplish the desired result of strict liability."1 o8 Finally, in
Williams v. West Penn Power Co.,109 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed
the issue. The court adopted a pro-plaintiff position by holding that plaintiffs "have
the option of proceeding in tort, governed by the tort statute of limitations, or under
the Code, governed by the Code statute of limitations." 110 This ruling means that
sellers of goods in Pennsylvania will have to wait until both statutes of limitations
expire before they are relieved of potential liability. Apparently, the only way to solve
the applicability problem is to make the statutes more consistent.
VI. PROPOSAL TO AMEND SECTION 2-725
If the only problem involved in applying section 2-725 were whether a warranty
extended to future performance, a simple change in the wording of the statute might
suffice. This could be accomplished by specifying the precise language necessary to
create a future performance warranty. However, because of the additional confusion
surrounding the choice of the applicable statute of limitations, substantive changes in
section 2-725 are necessary in order to end the confusion. As presently written,
section 2-725 is not serving its stated purpose of providing "a uniform statute of
limitations for sales contracts, thus eliminating the jurisdictional variations and
providing needed relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide scale whose
contracts have heretofore been governed by several different periods of limitation
depending upon the state in which the transaction occurred. '""1t Rather than intro-
ducing a uniform statute of limitations, section 2-725 has created great uncertainty.
As Professors White and Summers have pointed out, "we can do little more than warn
the lawyer not to make hasty judgments about the applicable statute of limitations or
about when it will commence to run." 11 2
In many instances, liberal construction of section 2-725(2) by the judiciary has
failed to give effect to the general rule that "[a] cause of action accrues when the
breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the
breach." 3 Arguably, liberal construction has sometimes been contrary to the
original expectations of the parties. By sometimes applying a tort statute of limitations
to breach of warranty actions, courts have failed to adhere to the mandate that section
2-725 applies to "[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale." 114 These
observations are not intended as criticisms of the judiciary. Rather, they are pointed
out to underscore the existing problems and to emphasize the need for change.
108. Id. at 1103. The court cited Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment m (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MiNN. L. REv.
791, 802 (1966).
109. 502 Pa. 557, 467 A.2d 811 (1983).
110. Id. at 570, 467 A.2d at 818.
111. U.C.C. § 2-725 official comments (1978).
112. J. WarME & R. SuMaiesS, supra note 11, at 420.
113. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978).
114. Id. § 2-725(1).
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Before proposing an amended version of section 2-725, it is important to set
forth the policies that the proposed version should serve. First, and perhaps most
importantly, the new section should protect the expectation interest'1 5 of the con-
tracting parties. However, the very nature of a statute of limitations is to cut off
claims. Naturally, some of the expired claims will be valid and a party's expectation
interest will be lost. What must be avoided is a statute of limitations that acts too
harshly or that ignores commercial realities. Second, the new section should allow the
parties freedom to contract as they wish. The current version of section 2-725 does
a good job of this by allowing the parties in their original agreement to reduce the
period of limitations to not less than one year," 6 or by allowing them to extend the
period, in effect, by using a future performance warranty." 7
In addition to furthering these two policies, a proposed change must be examined
closely to ensure that it is meeting the commercial needs of buyers and sellers. This
should be a prime concern of any section of a commercial code. If courts feel that a
section is failing in this area, they will find ways of circumventing the language of
the section to achieve what is felt to be a fair result. The present wording of section
2-725 has created this type of situation.
In order to achieve a fairer statute that will promote uniformity, the following
revised version of section 2-725 is proposed:
SECrION 2-725: STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS IN CONTRACTS FOR SALE
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within two years
after the claimant has discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have
discovered the breach.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), no action may be brought more than ten years
from the time tender of delivery is made.
(3) The ten year period provided in subsection (2) for bringing an action may be altered
as follows:
a. if a seller expressly and explicitly warrants that its product can be utilized for a
stated period longer than ten years, the period of repose shall be extended
according to that warranty or promise;
b. by the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of repose provided in
subsection (2) to a period not less than one year.
(4) [Current § 2-725(3)] Where an action commenced within the time limited by
subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the
same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of time limited
and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination
resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to
prosecute.
(5) [Current § 2-725(4)] This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act
becomes effective.
115. See supra note 35.
116. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978).
117. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) prevents the parties from contractually creating a period of limitation in excess of four years.
By using a future performance warranty, however, the parties can achieve this result by delaying the running of the four-
year period.
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It is readily conceded that the above proposal calls for a major substantive change
in section 2-725. However, a change of this magnitude is needed in order to settle an
area of law which has been the subject of much litigation. A substantial portion of the
proposal is derived from the statute of limitations in the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act.'18 As a result, the proposed section 2-725 works like a tort statute of
limitations.
Subsection (1) includes two major changes from the current statute. The most
significant of these changes is that it adopts the date of discovery of the breach as the
time when the statutory period will begin to run. This will prevent a buyer's action
from being barred before the breach is discovered. This eliminates a major source of
judicial dissatisfaction with the current statute. This subsection also prevents buyers
from trying to take advantage of sellers by beginning the statutory period when the
buyer "should have discovered the breach." Thus, a buyer cannot purposely remain
blind to current defects and still have a right to bring a suit many years later. Also,
118. MODEL UNMroRaM PRODucr LUABILI Acr, supra note 36, at § 110 provides:
(A) Useful Safe Life.
(I) Except as provided in Subsection (A)(2), a product seller shall not be subject to liability to a claimant for
harm under this Act if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm was caused
after the product's "useful safe life" had expired.
"Useful safe life" begins at the time of delivery of the product and extends for the time during which the
product would normally be likely to perform or be stored in a safe manner. For the purposes of Section 110,
"time of delivery" means the time of delivery of a product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged
in the business of either selling such products or using them as component parts of another product to be sold.
Examples of evidence that is especially probative in determining whether a product's useful safe life had
expired include:
(a) The amount of wear and tear to which the product had been subject;
(b) The effect of deterioration from natural causes, and from climate and other conditions under which the
product was used or stored;
(c) The normal practices of the user, similar users, and the product seller with respect to the circumstances,
frequency, and purposes of the product's use, and with respect to repairs, renewals, and replacements;
(d) Any representations, instructions, or warnings made by the product seller concerning proper maintenance,
storage, and use of the product or the expected useful safe life of the product; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or third party.
(2) A product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused by a product used beyond its useful safe life to
the extent that the product seller has expressly warranted the product for a longer period.
(B) Statute of Repose.
(1) Generally. In claims that involve harm caused more than ten (10) years after time of delivery, a presumption
arises that the harm was caused after the useful safe life had expired. This presumption may only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence.
(2) Limitations on Statute of Repose.
(a) If a product seller expressly warrants that its product can be utilized safely for a period longer than ten (10)
years, the period of repose, after which the presumption created in Subsection (B)(1) arises, shall be extended
according to that warranty or promise.
(b) The ten-(10-) year period of repose established in Subsection (B)(1) does not apply if the product seller
intentionally misrepresents facts about its product, or fraudulently conceals information about it, and that
conduct was a substantial cause of the claimant's harm.
(c) Nothing contained in Subsection (B) shall affect the right of any person found liable under this Act to seek
and obtain contribution or indemnity from any other person who is responsible for harm under this Act.
(d) The ten-(10-) year period of repose established in Subsection (B)(1) shall not apply if the harm was caused
by prolonged exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-causing aspect of the product that existed at the
time of delivery was not discoverable by an ordinary reasonably prudent person until more than ten (10) years
after the time of delivery, or if the harm, caused within ten (10) years after the time of delivery, did not manifest
itself until after that time.
(c) Statute of Limitation. No claim under this Act may be brought more than two (2) years from the time the
claimant discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, the harm and the cause thereof.
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by simulating the statute of limitations used for product liability actions, it is hoped
that courts will be more willing to apply section 2-725 in breach of warranty cases
that involve personal injuries. This will promote the uniformity that the Code is
intended to achieve.
One disadvantage of adopting the date-of-discovery rule is that sellers will not
be certain how long they will be subject to liability and, in general, older actions will
be permitted to be brought. Subsections (2) and (3) attempt to address these concerns
directly by limiting the period of potential liability and by allowing the parties, in
effect, to create their own limitation period. Sellers can hardly claim certainty under
the present state of confusion. In any event, the benefits to be obtained by the
proposed change outweigh any added inconveniences that sellers might suffer.
The other major change in subsection (1) is the reduction of the statutory period
to two years. This appears to be a reasonable period in light of the fact that it will not
begin to run until the breach is discovered. If a breach manifests itself within two
years of tender of delivery then the period for bringing an action will actually be
shorter than the present period.
Subsection (2) creates an outside limit of ten years in which a seller can be held
liable for a breach. This type of limit is known as a statute of repose. The Model
Uniform Product Liability Act identifies several reasons for having a statute of repose:
First, the fact that a product has been used safely for a substantial period of time is some
indication that it was not defective at the time of delivery. Second, if a product seller is
not aware of a claim, the passing of time may make it extremely difficult to construct a
good defense because of the obstacle of securing evidence. . . The third rationale is that
persons ought to be allowed, as a matter of policy, to plan their affairs with a reasonable
degree of certainty.' 19
The ten-year period of repose provided in subsection (2) is unlikely to create a
hardship for consumers. A recent survey of product liability claims disclosed that over
ninety-seven percent of product-related accidents occur within six years of the time
the product was purchased.' 20 Of the less than three percent of claims remaining, it
is reasonable to assume that many of these were not the result of a breach by the seller,
but were the result of misuse by the buyer. In the end, it must be remembered that
all statutes of limitations cut off some valid claims.
Subsection (3) of the proposed statute modifies what might be considered
harshness in the ten-year statute of repose. Subsection (3)(a) extends the ten-year
period in a case in which a seller warrants its product for longer than ten years. Under
this section, a buyer can receive a twenty-year warranty on a roof and rest assured that
the statute of limitations will pose no problems if the roof only lasts fifteen years. It
is important that the two-year period provided in subsection (1) is not changed by a
warranty greater than ten years. Thus, if the roof begins to leak after three years, the
buyer would then have only two years to bring suit. It is hoped that by requiring that
a seller "expressly and explicitly" warrant its product "for a stated period longer than
119. Id. (analysis of § 110).
120. Massery, Date-of-Sale Statutes ofLimitations-A New Immunityfor Product Suppliers, 1977 INs. L.J. 535,542
n.40.
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ten years," courts will strictly construe language in contracts so as not to extend the
ten-year period except when it was clearly the intention of the parties to extend the
period.121 Clearly, an implied warranty cannot pass this test.
Subsection (3)(b) was included for a seller that wishes to limit its liability, or
needs to know exactly how long it will be subject to liability and how long it must
keep its records. Subsection (3)(b) achieves the same result as the last sentence in the
current subsection (1) of section 2-725. It allows the parties to limit contractually to
one year the period in which to bring an action. This preserves the parties' freedom
to contract, which is a goal of the Uniform Commercial Code.122 Subsection (3)(b)
is important to sellers that do not want to be exposed to liability for a ten-year period.
Courts, through the doctrine of unconscionability,123 can police agreements to reduce
the period of repose in order to assure that they are reasonable.
VII. CONCLUSION
Section 2-725 has not been successful in achieving its purpose of creating a
uniform statute of limitations. ' 24 The future performance exception has given courts
a means of manipulating section 2-725 to achieve the results they desire.125 As a
result, it is often difficult to predict when the statutory period has run.
This Note has set forth a proposed revision that will help to resolve the problems
associated with section 2-725. The proposed revision is not the only way to resolve
these problems. However, it does propose change in an area of law in which change
is needed. It is hoped that this Note will stimulate the thought and motivation needed
to achieve reform of section 2-725.
Kevin D. Lyles
121. See-supra note 118.
122. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
123. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978) provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 56-82.
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